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The	Lyndon	B.	Johnson	Space	Center	(JSC)	is	based	in	
Houston,	Texas	and	focuses	on	manned	space	flight,	
conducting	space	research	and	development,	providing	
mission	control,	and	training	of	US	astronauts.	In	1961	
the	Manned	Spacecraft	Center	grew	out	of	the	Space	
Task	Group	based	in	Langley,	Virginia,	that	had	been	
formed	in	1958	with	an	original	workforce	of	45	
people.	When	President	Kennedy	in	1961	posed	the	
goal	of	putting	a	man	on	the	moon	by	the	end	of	the	
decade,	NASA	realised	that	a	more	expanded	capability	
would	be	needed,	at	a	new	site.	The	Clearlake,	Houston	
site	was	announced	in	1961,	selected	out	of	a	total	of	
23	sites	under	consideration.	The	organization	received	
its	current	name	in	1973	in	honor	of	US	President	
Lyndon	B.	Johnson.	Gradually	JSC	grew	to	its	current	
personnel	size	of	14,000,	3,000	of	which	are	civil	
servants	and	11,000	contractors.	Over	the	years	JSC	
has	had	primary	responsibility	for	the	Mercury,	Gemini,	
Apollo	and	Space	Shuttle	programs,	as	well	as	the	
International	Space	Station	and	Orion1.		
	
Ellen	Ochoa,	the	11th	Director	of	JSC	took	office	in	
2012.	She	presented	JSC’s	mission	and	strategies	to	the	
NASA	Advisory	Council’s	Commercial	Space	Committee	
in	May	20122.	In	accordance	with	the	overall	NASA	
vision	“to	reach	new	heights	and	reveal	the	unknown,	
so	that	what	we	do	and	learn	will	benefit	all	
humankind”,	JSC’s	mission	is	to	“lead	a	global	
enterprise	in	human	space	exploration	that	is	
sustainable,	affordable	and	benefits	all	humankind.”	
JSC	has	posed	four	primary	strategies	to	achieve	that	
mission.	First,	to	“lead	human	exploration”	through	
such	capabilities	and	assets	as	the	International	Space	
Station	and	commercialization	of,	and	reaching	
beyond,	Low	Earth	Orbit.	Second,	to	“lead	
internationally”	in	human	space	exploration	by	
leveraging	the	collaborative	experience	gained	at	the	
International	Space	Station	and	by	championing	
international	initiatives.	Third,	to	“excel	in	leadership,	
management	and	innovation”	in	terms	of	technical	and	
business	management	practices,	and	by	engaging	the	
human	spaceflight	team.	Fourth,	to	“expand	relevance	
to	life	on	earth”	through	partnerships	with	economic	
and	social	impact,	engaging	society,	and	
communicating	with	stakeholders.		
	
In	that	presentation,	Director	Ochoa	explicitly	noted	
the	need	for	“paradigm	change”	within	JSC	in	pursuit	of	
effective	commercial	partnerships.	This	entails	the	
development	of	relationships	with	industry,	academia	
and	government,	establishing	non-profit	partnerships,	
creating	higher	customer	focus,	and	adopting	industry	
best	practices	such	as	lean	development	and	rapid	
prototyping.	One	key	challenge	has	been	to	transform	
“JSC’s	culture	to	one	that’s	reliable,	progressive,	
innovation-centered	and	easy	to	work	with.”3		
	
In	2013,	Director	Ochoa	unveiled	an	organization	
change	program	labelled	JSC	2.0.	She	explained	it	as	
follows:	“My	concept	of	JSC	2.0	asks	a	fundamental	
question:	If	we	were	starting	JSC	today,	how	would	we	
build	a	space	center	to	reach	our	vision	of	leading	a	
global	enterprise	in	human	space	exploration	that	is	
sustainable,	affordable	and	benefits	humankind?	What	
expertise	would	need	to	be	resident	at	JSC?	What	
facilities	would	be	required?	Where	else	can	we	find	
expertise	and	facilities	that	could	be	used,	and	how	
would	we	collaborate?	How	would	we	be	organized	to	
most	efficiently	and	effectively	carry	out	our	work?	
What	tools	and	processes	would	we	use?	How	can	we	
be	more	nimble	and	adaptable	to	change,	and	stay	that	
way	in	the	future?	I	hope	everyone	at	JSC	will	engage	in	
‘re-inventing’	JSC	so	that	both	our	current	programs	
and	projects,	as	well	as	ones	we	hope	to	carry	out	in	
the	future,	will	be	successful.”4		
The	themes	of	leanness,	adaptability	and	agility	were	
featured	in	internal	publications	over	the	next	few	
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years.	A	re-organization	of	JSC	initiated	in	2014	for	
example	had	as	its	chief	goal	to	accomplish	“a	structure	
and	governance	that	is	more	lean,	agile,	and	adaptive	
to	change.”5		The	internal	publication	Roundup	
repeated	these	themes	in	2015	and	2016.	In	2016,	the	
evolving	change	program	labeled	JSC	2.016	included	
enabling	change	as	one	of	four	overarching	themes	(in	
addition	to	connecting	to	the	mission,	making	
programs	successful	and	removing	obstacles).		
It	was	in	this	organizational	change	context	that	in	
August	2016	we	spoke	with	Douglas	Terrier,	who	took	
on	the	role	of	Chief	Technology	Officer	at	the	Johnson	
Space	Center	in	April	2013.6	In	this	role,	Terrier	is	
responsible	for	JSC’s	technology	investment	strategy	
and	integration	of	JSC’s	technology	portfolio.	Before	
joining	NASA	in	2003	to	take	up	engineering	and	
strategy	roles,	Terrier	had	worked	for	23	years	in	
commercial	aerospace	with	Lockheed	Martin,	General	
Dynamics	and	General	Electric	Aircraft	Engines.	This	
wide-ranging	experience,	in	both	the	commercial	as	
well	as	government	domains,	and	in	both	technical	and	
business-oriented	roles,	gave	Terrier	a	broad	
perspective	not	only	in	terms	of	technology	but	also	in	
terms	of	organizational	change	at	JSC	and	the	agency	
as	a	whole.			
	
Heracleous	
	
Terrier	
Thank	you	for	making	the	time	to	speak	with	
us	about	JSC’s	and	NASA’s	journey	towards	
agility.		
One	thing	that	I	wanted	to	talk	about	that's	
been	on	my	mind,	and	this	is	from	the	chief	
technologist	perspective;	the	idea	that	for	
most	of	the	period	since	the	industrial	
revolution,	the	time	frame	between	the	
refresh	rate	on	any	technology	has	been	
around	a	decade,	or	a	couple	of	decades.	
Our	time	frame	of	our	NASA	processes,	
certification,	all	that,	is	also	about	a	decade.	
Unfortunately,	we've	now	found	ourselves	
in	a	period	where	the	refresh	rate	on	
certainly	anything	that	has	to	do	with	
computers	or	artificial	intelligence,	all	the	
things	that	are	going	to	be	pivotal	to	the	
new	space	technology,	is	completely	out	of	
phase	with	our	own	processes.	So	I	think	
this	is	a	forcing	function	that	we're	not	
really	paying	attention	to.	Our	processes,	by	
definition,	produce	products	that	are	out	of	
phase	with	the	rapid	pace	of	technology.	So	
it's	out	of	our	control	that	this	18-month	
doubling	[Moore’s	law]	is	a	reality	in	many	
industries,	and	it's	not	just	in	computers.	In	
advanced	manufacturing,	certainly	in	
biomedicine,	anything	to	do	with	synthetic	
DNA,	all	this	stuff.	These	are	all	the	things	
that	are	going	to	have	huge	impact	on	the	
way	we	conduct	every	industry,	including	
ours.	And	yet	our	systems,	all	of	our	
certification,	all	of	our	design	reviews,	all	
these,	they're	fairly	fixed	-	phase	A,	phase	B,	
so	on,	and	so	on.	And	there	is	no	way	they	
can	possibly	take	advantage	of	this	new	
technology,	the	speed	of	technology.	
Heracleous		 Will	this	be	one	of	your	goals	in	your	new	
role?	[referring	to	Terrier’s	impending	move	
to	Washington	to	take	on	the	Chief	
Technology	Officer	role	agency-wide]	
Terrier		 I	think	this	is	one	of	the	things	that	I	have	to	
push	on,	because	we	have	a	whole	
institution	that	is	not	only	just	invested	in	
the	traditional	program	management	
model,	but	it	is	a	cornerstone	in	policy,	
hard-coded	into	how	we	do	business.	And	it	
spells	out	the	phases	that	you	necessarily	
have	to	go	through	to	get	anything	into	
flight,	safety	being	the	paramount	concern.	
But	given	today’s	accelerating	pace	of	
technology	it's	a	recipe	for	being	
obsolescent.	Because	of	the	traditional	way	
we	conduct	these	gated	milestones;	
preliminary	design	review,	CDR	(Critical	
Design	Review),	all	the	regular	things	that	
we	do;	there	is	no	fuzz,	you	have	to	follow	
this	process,	if	you're	a	vendor	doing	
business	with	NASA.	Let's	say	you	start	with	
design	requirements	and	so	on.	Now,	the	
technology	that	you	base-lined	is	upgraded.	
It's	a	386	processor	on	station	problem,	
right?	We	also	don't	have	an	efficient	way	
for	the	design	to	incorporate	that	refresh.	
So,	again,	you	don't	have	the	right	time-
phasing	to	really	keep	up	with	the	
technology,	and	you	don't	have	a	
mechanism	for	introducing	the	technology	
as	it	modifies.	
	 So	this	JSC2.0	idea	of	being	agile	and	
adaptive,	I	think,	there's	of	course	cultural	
and	organizational	things,	but	if	you	even	
look	at	just	the	engineering	systems,	
engineering	process,	it	tends	to	preclude	
that	agility	and	is	a	fundamental	limitation.	
So	we	say	we're	going	to	incorporate	more	
private	sector,	right?	But	a	condition	of	
doing	business	with	the	government	or	
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NASA	–	DoD	(Department	of	Defence),	same	
thing	-	is	you're	required	to	follow	this	
process,	right?	You're	required	to	follow	
these	steps	and	go	through	these	gates.	And	
so,	by	definition,	that,	again,	doesn't	really	
allow	you	to	really	take	full	advantage	of	
technology.	So	I	think,	bottom	line	is	-	we	
can	talk	about	our	process	and	our	culture	
needed	to	become	more	agile,	but	I	think	
talking	about	that,	sort	of	in	the	mindset	of	
20th	century	technology	is	not	very	helpful.	
And	you	know,	we	can	go,	we	can	
extrapolate	that	and	talk	about	singularity	
and	when	machines	are	designing	machines	
so	that	refresh	rate	becomes	exponentially	
more	rapid.	So	how	do	you	make	the	
process	agile	enough	to	accommodate	this?	
I	think	that's,	to	me,	that	is	the	biggest	
opportunity-cost,	if	you	want	to	call	it	that.	
Heracleous		 Do	you	have	support	for	this	thinking	in	
Washington?	I	was	just	wondering,	whether	
you	talked	about	this	and	they	said	“great”	
and...	
Terrier		 Of	course.	I	think	by	definition,	the	way	this	
agency	works	allows	the	Chief	
Technologist’s	Office	to	be	the	champion	of	
these	kind	of	radical	ideas,	right?	So	yes,	is	
the	short	answer	to	your	question.	I	think	
it's	probably	fair	that	yeah,	there	was	some	
resonance	with	that.	I	have	to	say	that	the	
organization	is	set	up,	both	here	at	JSC	and	
in	D.C.,	to	be	tolerant	of	the	Chief	
Technologist	sort	of	being	the	far-out	voice.	
And	we'll	listen,	but	then	we've	got	our	
process,	and	that	has	to	be	balanced	against	
that	far-out	voice.	This	is	a	pretty	rigid	
process,	and,	though	we're	listening	to	that	
voice,	there's	often	no	place	in	the	process	
to	insert	that	voice.	
Heracleous		 We	can	take	the	discussion	wherever	you	
would	like.	What	I	was	thinking	was	maybe	
we	can	start	with	JSC	2.0	and	what	does	
agility	mean	for	JSC?	What	have	been	the	
challenges	up	to	now?	And	then	move	
maybe	to	your	role	in	the	whole	agency,	and	
maybe	do	you	have	any	thoughts	about	how	
you	might	approach	helping	NASA	become	
more	agile?	In	our	workshop	today	we	
talked	about	dimensions	of	agility.	So	we	
said	one	is	leadership,	being	able	to	sense	
the	environment	outside	-	not	only	sense	
but	engage,	think	about	what	it	means,	and	
take	action.	Then	we	talked	about	agility	at	
the	organization	level,	experimenting,	
reallocating	resources	and	actively	looking	
at	outdated	processes	and	saying,	“this	
doesn't	serve	us	anymore”	and	changing	it.	
And	then	finally,	the	strategic	dimension	
where	we	say,	“do	you	need	to	change	your	
business	model,	the	way	you	do	things?”	Do	
you	engage	with	networks,	and	do	you	
balance	speed	and	stability?		
Terrier		 I'll	give	you	my	view	of	it,	I	have	to	start	at	
the	beginning	since	we're	talking	about	JSC	
2.0.	So	you've	got	an	organization	that	is	
absolutely	invested	in	cultural	beliefs,	
norms,	that	what	we	do	in	human	space	
flight	is	unique,	and	that	it	is	completely	
different	from	what	the	rest	of	the	world	
does	-	going	back	to	Apollo.	These	things	
don't	exist	anywhere,	these	challenges,	so	
we	have	to	invent	everything.	We	have	to	
do	everything	internally	because	we're	
facing	extreme	requirements	that	haven't	
been	faced	before.	And	that	was	true,	
actually.	I	think	one	of	the	hardest	things	
about	-	any	cultural	norms	-	is	that	when	
they're	based	on	reality,	it	becomes	very	
hard	to	change	them.	However,	over	time	
the	reality	has	changed.	So	you've	got	an	
organization	that	very	much	values	that	
internal	reliance	on	doing	everything,	self-
inventiveness,	based	on	the	premise	that	
there's	nobody	outside	that's	doing	this,	and	
you	get	that	embedded	in	the	organization.	
And	you	find	that	that's	been	a	very	
successful	model,	actually.	And	then	you	
bring	that	all	the	way	forward	through	
Apollo	and	Shuttle	and	the	International	
Space	Station,	and	largely	that	model	
remains	effective.	
	 And	now	you	come	to	today.	And	what	we	
have	is	many	of	the	same	cultural	biases,	I	
will	call	it,	in	the	organization.	When	in	fact,	
the	premise,	the	assumption,	that	people	
outside	aren't	dealing	with	some	of	these	
challenges	is	just	no	longer	true,	because	of	
the	Dot	Com	revolution,	because	of	
everything	that's	going	on	in	Silicon	Valley,	
in	some	cases	far	more	innovative.	Also,	
now	you	have	a	commercial	space	industry	
that's	operating	without	the	same	
constraints.	So	they	have	a	different	speed	
of	invention	and	agility.	Because	they're	not	
constrained	by	these	processes	that	worked	
so	well	for	decades.	That	self-reliant	culture	
made	sense,	but	now	we	have	an	
organization	that's	really,	by	nature	of	its	
very	culture,	not	that	curious	about	outside,	
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because	it's	convinced	that	it's	not	that	
relevant;	it's	different	out	there.	They're	
doing	oil	and	gas,	they're	doing	different	
things.	We're	doing	space.		
Heracleous		 Is	this	still	the	case?	
Terrier		 I	would	say	you	can	find	it	broadly,	not	just	
inside	NASA.	You	can	look	in	the	broad	
culture	and	people	say,	“It's	not	rocket	
science.”	Which	means	it's	not	hard,	so	why	
would	I	ask	them?	We're	doing	the	hard	
stuff.	We	know	the	hard	stuff,	right?	It's	an	
interesting	thing.	People	don't	walk	around	
with	that	consciously,	but	subconsciously	
the	implication	is,	I'm	doing	the	rocket	
science.	Why	would	I	ask	somebody	who's	
not	doing	rocket	science?	So	I	think	it's	
entirely	across	the	whole	culture.	The	
corollary	is	that	people	outside	would	say,	“I	
never	knew	I	was	invited	to	participate,	
because	I'm	not	a	rocket	scientist.	That's	
hard	stuff,	man,	I	don't	know	what	I	could	
contribute,”	which	is	not	true	anymore.	So	
in	response	our	leadership	have	taken	a	
bold	step	by	saying,	“I'm	going	to	have	a	JSC	
2.0	initiative.	I'm	going	to	reinvent	the	
culture.	I'm	going	to	draw	the	control	
volume	around	the	human	space	
community,”	including	headquarters,	the	
contractor	community,	so	on,	“and	I'm	
going	to	reinvent	that	community,	move	the	
pieces	around	within	that	chess	board.”	But	
we’re	still	not	challenging	ourselves	enough	
to	look	outside,	right?	Because	all	the	rocket	
scientists	are	inside	this	control	volume.	So	
why	would	we	even	ask	outside?	
Heracleous		 Was	this	explicit,	or...?	
Terrier		 No,	not	at	all,	but	it	gets	back	to	our	cultural	
biases.	If	you	look	at	the	implementation,	
we	read	the	words	and	you	say,	“I	want	to	
be	more	agile.	I'm	going	to	be	responsive	to	
change.”	We	should	say	“responsive	to	
change”	means	we’ve	got	to	look	outside	to	
see	what	the	change	is,	but	that's	not	what	
is	happening	in	practice	in	many	cases	–	a	
lot	of	our	effort	is	concentrated	
internally.	So	I	would	say,	to	come	to	the	
question,	when	you	look	at	the	challenges	-	
or	the	difficulty	we've	had	with	really	
realizing	the	full	potential	of	JSC	2.0	-	it's	
fundamentally	that,	on	that	point,	that	you	
can't	actually	be	agile	and	be	responsive	if	
you	don't	fully	understand	the	change	
outside.	And	the	change	is	the	new	space	
companies,	the	public-private	partnership	
opportunities	with	other	industries,	with	
people	like	yourself.	People	are	doing	good	
work	all	around	us,	and	if	you	don't	know	
what	that	is	-	and	we're	very	sincere	by	the	
way	about	wanting	to	embrace	change.	
We're	very	sincere,	but	we	haven’t	yet	fully	
understood	the	changes	outside	our	own	
ecosystem	here.	
Heracleous		 Because	of	the	embedded	culture?	
Terrier		 Because	of	the	embedded	bias	around	
that.	And	also	remember	that	the	people	
that	were	told	20	years	ago,	“Look,	you	
don't	want	to	be	distracted	by	going	to	the	
opera,	or	going	to	the	art	show,	or	other	
industries,	because	we	have	hard	work	to	
do.	It's	hard	engineering.	It'	i	rocket	
science,”	they	grew	up	reinforced,	and	they	
came	up	and	got	certified	in	a	very	rigorous	
process.	These	people	are	at	the	top	of	their	
game.	They	are	very	invested	in	this	path	
that	they've	taken,	a	path	that	has	largely	
proved	to	be	very	effective.		So	they've	
learned	for	20	years	not	to	look	outside.	
Whether	they	meant	to	or	not,	that	entire	
certification	process	was	totally	internal.	
None	of	that	certification	asked,	“How	good	
are	you	at	looking	at	trends	around	you?	
How	good	are	you	at	organizationally	
responding	to	them?”	None	of	that	was	
asked	in	their	roles,	and	they've	been	very	
effective	at	the	most	challenging	
environment	and	rewarded	for	that.	So	of	
course	they're	going	to	perpetuate	that,	
right?	
Heracleous		 And	when	you	tried	to	raise	these	points,	
what	happened?	Because	you're	very	
elaborate	about	them,	and	you	can	explain	
them...	
Terrier		 So	I	have	the	very	good	fortune	to	be	on	the	
senior	council	here.	And	again,	I'm	sort	
of	the	one	voice	on	the	extreme.	I'm	the	
progressive	voice	in	the	conservative	room.	
Everybody	is	very	respectful	and	very	willing	
to	listen,	but	what	happens	is	you	tend	to	
have	one	person	saying,	“Hey,	this	
environment	around	us	is	changing	very	
fast.”	And	you	have	ten	very	credible,	very	
valued	voices,	saying,	“No,	no,	no.	That's	
just	PowerPoint	engineering.	They're	making	
that	up.	They	have	overly	optimistic	views.	
They	haven't	been	at	this	for	40	years	and	
don’t	know	how	hard	it	is,	how	dangerous	it	
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is.	They	don't	know	how	much	rocket	
science	this	is.”	
	 And	at	JSC	we	find	ourselves	-	not	
intentionally,	but	because	of	our	paradigm,	
in	the	camp	that	will	defend	the	traditional	
model,	for	good	reasons	because	we	believe	
it's	safer,	it's	well	understood.	We	know	the	
process.	We're	following	all	the	lengthy	
process	through	all	the	gates.	“I	don't	know	
what's	going	on	over	here,	but	it	doesn't	
look	like	this	thing	that	I	know	produces	
safe,	reliable	results.	I	don't	trust	it,	it	is	
unproven	so	I'm	going	to	defend	this.”	It	
may	be	difficult	to	be	completely	objective,	
because	we’re	fully	involved	and	invested	in	
the	model	we	know	and	understand.	The	
contractor	community	I'm	used	to	is	
involved,	my	friends,	my	relatives,	jobs	are	
involved.	This	is	big.	And	if	you	wake	up	one	
morning	and	make	radical	changes,	it's	not	
just	a	matter	of	academically	saying,	“Oh,	
this	is	a	better	model.”	You're	talking	about	
laying	people	off.	You're	talking	about	
families	losing	their	homes.	It's	a	big	deal.	
You're	talking	about	congressional	support	
that's	invested	in	these	jobs	and	these	
districts	and	so	on.	This	is	a	big	thing.	And	
so,	it	would	be	naive	of	us	to	say,	“nobody	
wants	to	listen	to	a	different	voice,”	
because	it	has	huge	implications	and	we	
have	to	make	balanced	decisions.	You're	
well	aware	of	this,	it's	a	big	thing.	So	I	don't	
think	it	would	be	fair	to	be	too	critical	of	
people	that	are	very	cautious	to	look	at	a	
different	model.		
Heracleous		 Any	other	challenges	that	come	to	mind?	
From	our	discussion,	I	could	see	that,	the	
sensing	of	environmental	signals,	evaluating	
them	and	taking	initiative,	driving	forward,	
has	been	a	big	challenge.	One	is	maybe	
people	don't	actively	sense	what's	
happening	outside	or	even	if	they	do,	they	
don't	really	critically	evaluate	and	say,	“So	
what	does	it	mean	for	us?”	And	even	less	
taking	initiative	and	driving	forward.	And	I	
also	guess	from	our	discussion	that	unless	
the	leadership	bit	happens,	the	reallocating	
of	resources,	experimenting	and	actively	
removing	inertia	and	bureaucracy	may	not	
take	place	because	it	depends	on	leaders	
taking	action.	Is	this	also	what	you	find?	
Terrier		 Yeah,	and	we’re	trying	to	do	those	things.	
But	I	think	this	is	one	of	those	classic	
challenges,	the	Kodak	case	study	is	a	good	
one,	right?	This	idea	of	paradigms	and	I'm	
going	to	double	down	on	film	and	all	this.	
But	you	have	the	same	forces	at	work,	if	
90%	of	my	revenue	is	coming	from	film	
processing	and	kiosks	in	every	country,	you	
go	on	vacation,	you	take	your	film,	that's	the	
revenue	of	the	company,	right?	So	fine	to	
say	digital	is	the	way	of	the	future,	but	now	
the	entire	revenue	model	of	the	corporation	
and	the	work,	the	decades	of	infrastructure,	
the	people	staffing	the	kiosk	and	the	
processing,	they're	at	risk.	Inside	our	
organization	is	a	somewhat	similar	case.	It's	
fine	to	say	there	may	be	a	different	model	
that	may	be	more	public-private,	but	
remember,	this	process,	that's	very	rigorous,	
involves	civil	servants	and	NASA	people	
every	step	of	the	way	holding	your	hand	
through	each	gate	to	assure	safety.	If	I	say	
let	me	let	go	of	that,	and	I'm	going	to	let	
people	outside	have	more	of	a	role	with	less	
oversight,	what	are	these	people	doing?	All	
of	a	sudden	you	question	the	value	of	this	
oversight.	So	you	realize	that	each	of	the	
people	in	the	decision	making	roles	own	
part	of	those	processes.	Literally	their	staff	
is	part	of	this	process.	How	do	you	
objectively	evaluate	a	different	model?	Do	
we	just	give	a	contract	to	SpaceX	for	
example	and	accept	the	product	once	it	is	
demonstrated?	And	then	we	have	to	
understand	how	we	have	the	visibility	to	
assure	safety	in	these	new	models.	What	
does	that	mean	for	the	leader	who's	
responsible	for	the	hundreds	of	talented	
people	who	job	is	rooted	in	the	traditional	
model,	in	assuring	all	these	steps?	So	I	think	
this	also	involves	the	human	nature,	loyalty	
thing	even	more.	That's	at	a	personal	level,	
it	makes	objectivity	very	challenging		
Heracleous		 And	with	Kodak,	I	think	the	most	interesting	
part	of	that	story	is	that	Kodak	invented	the	
digital	camera.	It	came	from	them.	And	we	
see	also	with	NASA	a	lot	of	the	technologies	
that	are	used	in	commercial	space	come	
from	here.	
Terrier		 Yes.	I	think	that's	to	me	the	most	
interesting.	And	the	second	interesting	
aspect	is	that	in	the	late	1990s	the	Kodak	
board	made	a	conscious	decision	to	invest	...	
they	actually	had	a	choice	between	digital	
and	film,	and,	even	though	they	saw	the	
trends,	they	took	a	conscious	decision	to	
invest	in	professional	film,	a	new	
formulation.	Because	they	thought	they	
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could	persuade	the	market	to	come	back,	
buy	a	better	product.	This	is	what's	going	
on.	We	see	the	trend,	but	we	think	if	we	just	
do	the	traditional	model	better	we	can	bring	
the	whole	market	forces	back.	A	lot	of	
people	don't	realize	they	had	the	money	to	
invest	in	digital.	They	made	a	conscious	
decision	that,	“Yeah,	I	see	the	market's	
going	there,	but	man	if	I	come	out	with	a	
better	formulation.”	Why?	Because	
everybody	on	the	board	grew	up	as	
chemists,	grew	up	in	chemistry.	They	
weren't	electronics	people.	This	is	their	
passion,	and	so	on,	and	they	personally	
believed	that	everybody	would	see	that	in	
fact	it’s	a	better	product.	Our	people	really	
believe	that	if	I	just	do	my	traditional	model	
better,	everybody	will	see	it's	a	better	
product,	and	their	opinions	will	be	changed.	
Our	value	proposition	is	based	
predominantly	on	maybe	.999	safety	
posture.	It's	not	balanced	on	cost,	
reusability,	supply	chain,	things		that	drive	
decisions.	
Heracleous		 Which	are	all	the	things	that	I	think	the	
government	is	interested	in,	to	make	the	
public	sector	more	efficient.	
Terrier		 Exactly.	And	there	again	we	are	calibrated	
by	the	value	proposition	in	the	'70s,	which	is	
“the	government,	my	boss,	is	interested	in	
beating	the	Russians,	no	matter	the	cost.	So	
if	I	just	do	the	technical	part	well	I'm	good.”	
We	haven't	fully	embraced	the	new	
paradigm	that	the	government's	interested	
in	operating	more	like	the	private	sector	and	
its	efficiencies,	right?	But	we	have	few	
people	who	are	fully	fluent	in	those	values.	
Most	of	our	leadership	are	not	fluent	in	
business	terms,	because	we've	never	had	to	
be.	
	 So	what	we	do,	which	is	true	for	a	lot	of	
industries,	is	we	take	the	best	rocket	
designer,	and	make	them	managers.	We	are	
not	trained	as	CEOs.	We	often	have	little	
business	training.	We're	not	fluent	with	this	
language.	We're	very	fluent	with	the	
technical	language,	and	we	can	make	a	very	
good	case	why	this	99.999	solution	is	better	
than	a	commercial	company’s	99.99	
solution,	because	we	have	one	more	nine	
behind	it.	We	can	make	a	very	good	case	for	
it,	and	we	often	believe	that	that's	the	
entirety	of	the	trade.	
Heracleous		 Do	you	feel	lonely	having	this	
understanding,	when	not	many	other	
people	view	it	that	way?	
Terrier		 There	are	others	in	the	organization	who	are	
championing	change.	And	you	only	have	to	
step	out	to	talk	to	people	like	you,	or	you	
only	have	to	step	out	to	talk	to	people	in	
OSTP	(Office	of	Science	and	Technology	
Policy),	OMB	(Office	of	Management	and	
Budget).	You	don't	have	to	look	very	far	to	
find	a	lot	of	resonance	with	these	ideas.	
Heracleous		 And	just	to	look	at	the	strategic	aspect,	that	
is,	changing	the	business	model.	As	you	
mentioned,	from	inward	looking	to	kind	of	a	
network	model	working	with	industry,	
getting	value	through	networks	et	cetera,	so	
what's	interesting	is	that	JSC	has	been	
experimenting	with	open	innovation.	It	has	
had	industry	collaborations.	So	if	some	of	
these	things	have	been	happening,	why	is	it	
still	so	difficult	to	say	we	are	going	to	take	
this	model	and	sort	of	expand	it	and	slowly	
change	the	agency?	
Terrier		 I	think	that	that	speaks	to	the	culture	we	
have,	which	is	a	culture	that	is	tolerant	
of	different	views,	but	it's	not	the	same	as	
saying	I	hold	that	new	opinion	on	the	same	
level	as	the	traditional	views	that	have	been	
demonstrated	to	work.	So	we	can	tolerate	
both,	experiment	with	new	ideas	provided	
this	does	not	interfere	with	the	traditional	
role.	
Heracleous		 Okay,	so	it's	a	bit	like	I'm	doing	a	small	
experiment	that	shouldn't	threaten	the	way	
we	do	things?	
Terrier		 Exactly.	And	the	moment	you	start	to	
threaten	this,	you'll	find	that	you'll	get	a	
different	response.	First	rule	-	first,	do	no	
harm.	And	by	the	way,	just	to	be	clear,	the	
thought	behind	that	is	routed	in	hard	
earned	experience.	Nobody	comes	right	out	
and	says	it,	but	it's	implied.	Look,	these	lofty	
new	ideas	are	great.	That's	fine.	But	we're	
not	a	research	center	that	has	the	luxury	of	
trying	untested	ideas.	We're	an	operational	
center.	We	have	six	crew	on	orbit	right	now.	
We're	flying	spacecraft.	Our	paramount	
principle	has	to	be	safety.	Any	mistake,	the	
slightest	mistake,	can	cost	lives.	And	oh	by	
the	way,	as	people	are	fond	of	saying,	if	JSC	
gets	a	cold,	the	agency	gets	pneumonia.	If	
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JSC	and	human	space	flight	has	a	problem,	
the	agency's	done.	That's	actually	true.		
Heracleous		 Because	of	the	human	involvement...	
Terrier		 Because	of	the	human	aspect,	and	the	
public	interest.	So	you	can	fly	a	probe	and	
crash	it	into	Mars	all	day	long.	That’s	a	bad	
day,	but,	it's	not	in	the	papers,	we	can	
recover.	If	you	lose	a	national	hero,	that's	a	
very	big	problem.	Now,	with	that	in	mind,	
people	say,	“Look,	this	is	my	job,	and	if	I	am	
distracted	in	any	way,	somebody	may	get	
hurt.”	I'm	a	pilot,	and	there's	a	lot	of	truth	
to	this.	This	is	very,	very	critical	stuff.	Steven	
was	a	flight	director.	You	are	making	split-
second	decisions.	So	I	will	tolerate	you	
exploring	new	ideas,	but	the	moment	you	
interfere	and	get	my	eye	off	the	ball,	I'm	
done	playing.	Because	now	you're	going	to	
put	people	at	risk.	And	that's	how	we	tend	
frame	these	questions.	There's	a	compelling	
argument	there,	right?	So	the	question	is,	
how	can	you	find	a	way	to	have	an	
absolutely	bulletproof	operational	scenario	
that	can	continue	while	you	concurrently	
make	gradual	change	that's	not	disruptive?	
There's	a	lot	of	fear	that	change	will	be	
disruptive.	
	 I'm	going	to	give	you	one	last	example	on	
the	last	point.	If	you	go	in	the	old	control	
room	over	here,	the	Apollo	control	room,	
with	the	ancient	technology.	We	used	that	
up	to	1996.	So	you'll	see	the	new	control	
room	with	the	computers	and	so	on,	and	
you	see	the	old	one,	with	analog	technology	
and	tubes.	They	used	it	to	1996.	So	you'd	
say,	“Why	would	you	do	that?”	And	the	
organization	would	respond,	“Because	even	
though	I	know	-	not	that	I'm	stupid	and	I	
didn't	know	there's	much	better	technology	
-	but	I	have	known	for	20	years,	every	fault,	
every	possible	scenario,	every	possible	
mistake,	every	possible	anomaly,	and	I	know	
how	to	deal	with	it,	so	I	can	never	be	
surprised.	The	moment	I	introduce	the	new	
technology,	man,	now	I've	got	a	learning	
curve”.	Who	wants	to	be	the	guy	that's	the	
flight	director	on	that	learning	curve	when	
these	lives	are	at	stake?	Even	when	I'm	
aware	that	there's	a	better	system,	I'm	not	
taking	the	risk,	right?	We	delayed	that	as	
long	as	humanly	possible.	We	just	couldn't	
keep	that	thing	operating	anymore.	Once	
we	put	the	next	one	in	place,	we've	had	that	
one	for	another	20	years,	basically	till	MCC-
21	now.	For	the	very	same	reason.	
	 So	how	do	you	inject	change	into	that,	
right?	I	think	that	the	good	thing	is,	on	the	
positive	side,	these	are	the	brightest	people	
in	the	world	who	absolutely,	passionately	
want	to	do	the	best	for	their	
country.	Nobody's	here	because	they're	
going	to	make	a	fortune.	People	are	here	
because	they're	truly,	personally,	invested,	
so	it's	incredibly	sincere.	I	think	this	is	a	case	
where	you	have	to	show	people	with	small,	
unthreatening	examples	where	this	can	
work.	And	when	they	see	that	model,	
they're	smart,	they	will	see	that.	I	think	
we're	actually	doing	that	very	well	with	the	
Commercial	Crew	Program.	If	you	go	talk	to	
people	in	the	Commercial	Crew	Program	
they	won't	say,	“This	is	PowerPoint.	This	is	
just	nonsense,	it's	just	media	hype.”	They'll	
say,	“This	is	great.	And	I'm	absolutely	
invested	in	this	being	successful.”	
Heracleous		 What	is	the	Commercial	Crew	program?		
Terrier		 So	this	is	a	program	where	we	basically	said,	
“We're	gonna	pay	Elon	and	Boeing	
to	provide	the	transportation	to	the	
station.”	
Heracleous		 Instead	of	the	Russians?	
Terrier		 Instead	of	the	Russians.	So,	out	of	necessity	
frankly,	because	the	shuttle's	retired.	Now	
we	have	to	say,	“Man,	we	gotta	find	another	
way.”	By	the	way,	the	assumption	was,	
“there's	a	community	that	wants	to	adopt	a	
new	model.	Let	me	give	that	a	shot.	Okay,	
lets	start	with	the	flights	to	station,	a	near	
Earth	flight.	We'll	continue	in	our	traditional	
way	to	attack	the	very	hard	problem	of	
going	to	Mars	and	the	Moon	and	so	on.	But	
we'll	let	try	this	new	model	on	this	lower	
risk	mission”.	We	said:	“We	believe	you	can	
manage	that.	We'll	help	you	to	manage	
that,	it's	fairly	well	understood,	Low	Earth	
Orbit.”	As	we're	executing	that,	as	you	see	
on	TV,	you're	starting	to	see,	that	doesn't	
look	like	a	joke.	That	looked	like	these	guys	
are	really	operating	a	spacecraft,	right?	And	
the	people	who	are	in	that	community,	who	
are	the	part	of	NASA	supporting	them,	are	
now	very	much	embracing	and	invested	and	
this	does	work	very	well.	We	like	this	model.	
We	still	have	some	concerns	about	too	
many	shortcuts	from	the	model	that	we're	
used	to,	but	now	our	attitude	isn't,	‘Oh,	
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that's	never	going	to	work.	It's	nonsense.’	
Our	attitude	is	‘how	can	we	help	that	more	
agile	model	be	more	safe	and	work?’	Maybe	
there's	something	in-between,	right?”.	So	
how	can	we	bring	our	knowledge	to	make	it	
even	safer,	but	take	advantage	of	that	agility	
and	that	cost	saving?	And	the	reusability	
and	all	those	things.	So	now	you're	seeing	a	
lot	of	the	agency	invested,	the	people	
involved	in	that.	
	 Now,	you	go	one	step	out	from	that	and	
look	at	the	International	Space	Station	(ISS)	
–also	a	traditional	model.	But	we	can't	
continue	to	operate	the	International	Space	
Station	unless	we	have	the	transportation	
for	the	crews.	So	now	we	are	depending	on	
this	commercial	model	being	successful,	and	
now	you	get	the	International	Space	Station	
going,	“hold	on,	slow	down	everybody	at	
the	table.	No,	we	need	that	to	be	successful;	
that's	not	PowerPoint	engineering,	because	
if	that's	PowerPoint	engineering,	we	can’t	
support	and	resupply	this	$billion	space	
station	program,	because	we	don't	have	any	
other	way	to	make	it	work,	right?”	Now	the	
ISS	program	is	invested.	So	here,	the	Space	
Station	program	is	now	starting	to	change	
its	voice,	right?	So,	I	think	that's	a	good	
example	of	where	you	have	to	introduce	
new	ideas	in	a	way	that's	non-threatening.	
It's	the	lower	risk,	low	Earth	Orbit	solution	
and	we're	still	using	the	proven	traditional	
approach	in	the	high	risk	game.	But	we	will,	
through	experience,	get	more	comfortable	
with	the	new	model	as	it	proves	itself	over	
time	and	we	learn	how	to	safely	incorporate	
it.	
Heracleous		 So	it's	kind	of	an	incremental	change?	
Terrier		 Incremental,	exactly.	And	for	this	reason,	
I'm	actually	very	optimistic,	because	I	think	
we're	on	an	irreversible	path.	I	worry	about	
the	speed	of	that	progress,	but	I	think	-	and	
this	is	really,	really	important,	it's	about	how	
do	you	accelerate	that	through	the	system?	
How	do	you	increase	the	speed	of	that	
change?	Right	now,	in	that	arena,	because	
SpaceX	is	in	that	arena,	because	we,	the	
government,	have	introduced	a	new	model	
that	allows	them	to	compete.	They	wouldn't	
follow	the	whole	process,	right?	We’ve	
allowed	a	little	deviation,	essentially.	Now	
you	find	that	the	Boeings	and	the	
Lockheeds,	and	so	on	of	the	world	are	
saying,	"Wow.	If	I	want	to	be	in	that	market,	
I	have	to	find	a	way	to	also	make	my	process	
more	agile."	Today,	we're	largely	
maintaining	the	old	process	in	deep-space	
exploration	-	more	challenging,	more	
expensive	missions.	It's	like	everything	in	
the	private	sector,	if	there's	competition	
and	I	have	to	compete,	then	I	figure	it	out	if	
I	want	to	stay	in	business,	right?	On	the	
other	hand,	if	there's	a	government	contract	
that	continues	to	subsidize	an	
old,	expensive	model,	why	would	I	ever	
change?	And	so,	in	my	opinion,	keeping	the	
traditional	model	of	contracting	in	place	too	
long	may	actually	slow	the	progress	of	the	
industry.	Does	that	make	sense?	
Heracleous		 Yes.	Is	that	why	the	government	has	been	
tightening	the	budget?		
Terrier		 I	think	some	people	in	the	government	are	
trying	to	force	that	discussion.	That's	exactly	
right.		What's	been	happening	over	the	past	
few	years	is	that	the	white	house	tends	to	
propose	a	very	aggressive	budget	that	seeks	
to	encourage	new	models,	and	the	Congress	
comes	back	with	appropriation	language	
that	maintains	much	of	the	proven	
traditional	model	and	moves	more	
cautiously.	I	think	it	has	been	a	healthy	
tension	but	each	iteration	is	putting	more	
and	more	pressure	on	the	traditional	model.	
Heracleous		 So	you	mentioned	a	couple	of	very	
interesting	points,	and	what	you	said	
reminded	me	of	this	idea	of	positive	
deviance.	So	you	said	you	allowed	a	bit	of	a	
deviation,	and	then	it	kind	of	helps	to	
change	the	understanding	of	people	and,	
ideally,	move	the	system	forward.	So	the	
positive	deviance	could	explain	part	of	the	
process	of	the	commercial	space,	kind	of	
bringing	some	learning	to	NASA.	
Terrier		 I'm	one	of	those	who	would	probably	be	
comfortable	on	the	more	aggressive	end	of	
the	change	spectrum	So	I	would	say,	what	if	
we	expanded	that	model?	But	what	
happens	is	if	you	try	to	do	that	too	quickly	is	
you	get,	as	we	were	saying	before,	a	lot	of	
resistance	because	of	the	safety	concerns.	
However,	if	you	open	it	and	say,	“Let	me	
just	do	the	space	station	transport.”	Open	
that	as	the	beginning,	right?	But	the	deep	
space	exploration	and	Mars	missions,	that	
continues	with	a	more	traditional	system	for	
now.	Now	nobody	feels	threatened	while	
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we	experiment	with	and	prove	out	the	new	
models.	And	that's	what's	happened.	
Heracleous		 I	wonder	if	some	of	these	new	initiatives	-	
public-private	partnerships	-	maybe	remind	
people	of	this	historical	Faster,	Better,	
Cheaper,	which	had	mixed	outcomes.	
Terrier		 I	agree.	Yes,	I	think	that's	exactly	right.	And	I	
think	what	we	have	to	balance	is	there	are	a	
lot	of	very	good	stories	-	which	everybody	
around	here	can	tell	you	-	of	where	those	
initiatives	don't	work.	However,	those	
stories	are	based	in	1970,	1980,	whatever,	
and	it	turns	out	the	capability	outside	the	
bubble	is	different	today.	I	liked	it,	when	
people	tell	me	that	they	don't	trust	that,	for	
example,	Elon	can	take	a	couple	thousand	
young	kids	and	in	so	many	years	build	a	
spacecraft	that’s	going	to	be	safe.	I	like	to	
point	out	that's	interesting	because	this	
place	that	we're	sitting	in	was	built	in	1963.	
And	six	years	later	with	a	bunch	of	
20something-year-old	kids,	they	were	
landing	on	the	moon.	So	explain	to	me	why	
that	can't	be	done?	Oh	by	the	way,	they	had	
no	prior	knowledge,	no	resources	to	call	on.	
These	guys	have	the	entire	database	of	
NASA	and	experience	of	the	last	60	years	to	
call	on.	You	sure	they	can't	do	this	in	six	
years?	Why	is	that	PowerPoint	engineering	
all	of	a	sudden?	So	that's	a	calibration	that	I	
keep	in	mind.	Of	course	you	could	do	that	if	
you're	motivated.	We	have	evidence.	We	
have	empirical	evidence	that	can	be	done.	
Heracleous		 In	addition	to	the	incremental	way	we	
discussed,	do	you	have	any	other	thoughts	
of	how	you're	going	to	try	and	push	the	
agency	towards	more	agility,	particularly	in	
your	role	as	Chief	Technology	Officer?	As	
you	said,	you're	expected	to	be	a	bit	of	an	
outlier,	in	terms	of	how	people	see	things,	
and	expected	to	push	things	forward.	
Terrier		 I	anticipate	finding	myself	in	exactly	the	
same	position	in	Washington	as	I	am	here,	
which	is,	I	represent	the	outlier	position	at	
the	table.	And	you	have	a	decision	maker,	
these	are	smart	people,	so	they're	
interested	in	these	opinions,	but	it's	very	
hard	for	a	leader	to	hear	one	outlier	
opinion,	among	several	traditional	opinions	
and	just	automatically	assume	that's	
correct.	But	in	this	case	you	say,	“Leader,	go	
look.	Go	look	yourself.”	So	the	learning	is,	
my	role	is	to	bring	these	new	ideas	to	the	
attention	of	the	leader.		In	the	role	of	chief	
technology	officer,	I'm	not	required	to	have	
vested	interest	in	any	one	part	of	the	
organization.	My	job,	the	job	of	that	
position,	is	to	bring	to	the	administrator	
recommendations	based	on	facts.	Empirical	
data.	And	not	to	bring	any	organizational	
bias	or	whatever.	It's	supposed	to	be	an	
independent	adviser	on	technology	trends,	
and	so	on.	So,	I	think,	making	sure	that	role	
is	truly	vetted	as	being	an	honest	broker,	
independent	voice,	and	you	can	only	do	that	
by	providing	correlation	evidence.	Say	
“Here's	what	I've	told	you.	Look	for	
yourself.”	
Heracleous		 So	in	effect	you'll	be	trying	to	help	them	see	
what's	outside.	Helping	them	evaluate.	
Helping	them	act.	
Terrier		 Yes.	So	of	course	I	can	do	that	by	bringing	
data,	empirical	data.	It's	not	refutable.	
Again,	by	encouraging	us	to	look	outside.	
Some	learning,	benchmarking,	so	on.	Those	
techniques	would	be	welcome,	because	you	
could	do	that	in	a	very	nonthreatening	way.	
Let's	go	give	a	talk	here	and	see	what's	
going	on.	That's	my	job.	The	second	thing	is,	
that	role	does	have	implicitly	the	technology	
policy	advisory	role.	If	I	present	myself	as	
almost	an	auditor	from	the	outside,	with	the	
knowledge	of	how	this	thing	works	in	the	
real	world,	and	let	me	tell	you	how	it	is...	of	
course,	people	aren't	very	receptive	to	that	
view.	
Heracleous		 So	the	system	uses	its	immunity?	
Terrier		
	
	
	
	
Yes,	the	system	immunity	says,	“That's	
great,	but	you	don't	understand	how	it	
works	in	our	system.	You're	not	part	of	the	
system,	you're	not	part	of	the	team.”	And	
maybe	because	of	the	way	the	message	is	
transmitted,	“let	me	tell	you	what	smart	
people	from	the	outside	can	tell	you”.	
Nobody	reacts	really	well	to	that.	I	think	the	
trick	is	to	-	whether	you	do	it	with	this	
incremental	approach,	or	you	come	in	
as,	“I'm	a	member	of	the	team,	let	me	share	
some	ideas.	Let	me	share	something	I've	
learned.	Let	me	learn	from	you,	lets	learn	
together?”	You	know	what	I	mean?	
Heracleous		 And	traditionally,	the	autonomy	of	the	
centers	might	have	been	a	bit	of	a	barrier.		
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Terrier		 The	office	of	the	Chief	Technologist,	has	
been	fairly	independent	of	the	mission	
directors	within	the	agency	in	D.C.,	a	fairly	
independent	policy	adviser.	Similarly,	they	
have	not	been	integral	with	the	centers.	So,	
one	of	the	things	that	I	really	want	to	
change,	is	that	I	want	this	office	to	be	seen	
as	part	of	the	team,	not	an	external	audit.	
But	people	have	to	believe	you	have	their	
interest	in	mind,	not	really	to	be	an	auditor	
and	criticize.	I	also	want	to	do	the	same	
thing	where	we	have	a	Chief	Technologist	at	
each	center.	I	want	to	treat	those	Chief	
Technologists	as	the	staff	of	the	Agency	
CTO,	the	arms	and	legs.	Invite	them	into	the	
conversation,	and	you	take	a	position	for	an	
issue,	you	say,	“Well,	we've	talked	about	it	
among	the	community	and	this	is	what	I'm	
seeing,	but	here's	what	the	other	centers	
are	seeing	in	their	interactions.	Here's	a	
position.”	That's	a	much	more	defendable	
position	versus	one	independent	guy	who.	I	
think	those	relationships	within	the	agency	
and	with	the	centers	have	to	be	really	
worked	on,	so	they	become	truly	a	team.	
Gonzalez		 And	if	you	look	at	strategy,	creating	value	
through	networks,	that's	where	the	key	is	
for	what	you're	talking	about.	Number	one,	
doing	it	from	the	outside	coming	in,	to	try	to	
create	those	internal	networks,	never	works	
inside	the	agency.	So	already	having	the	
networks,	and	being	trusted	allows	you	to	
bring	that	up	there.	But	the	second	part,	
creating	the	networks	on	the	outside	after	
you	have	the	trust	on	the	inside	is	very	
different	than	coming	with	the	networks	
from	the	outside,	and	trying	to	bring	them	
in.	And	so,	I	think	the	power	of	being	able	to	
reach	out	to	OSTP	and	to	OMB	and	those	
other	organizations	when	you're	a	trusted	
insider	is	a	lot	more	effective	than	trying	to	
come	from	OMB	or	OSTP	into	the	
organization.	
Terrier		 And	I	would	extend	that.	I	agree	completely.	
I	would	extend	the	idea	of	having	an	office	
with	a	very	small	staff,	and	the	
implementation	is	done	with	the	center	
staff	so	that	it	is	truly	a	team	organization.	I	
would	say	that's	one	of	the	other	jobs	that	
office	has	in	addition	to	technology	policy.	
The	other	thing	is	how	does	NASA	
technology	affect	the	outside	world?	That's	
the	office	that's	going	to	champion	this.	To	
champion	the	work	of	the	guys	who	are	
busy	running	programs.	They	don't	always	
have	time	for	that.	That	CTO	has	to	be	the	
technology	champion.	Provide	feedback	to	
OSTP,	congress	and	other	stakeholders,	our	
investment	is	having	this	great	impact	in	
Houston,	is	having	this	great	impact	in	
Cleveland,	and	so	on.	Well	how	am	I	going	
to	do	that	with	a	small	staff?	We	have	
people	like	Stephen	at	JSC	and	at	other	
centers,	who	are	doing	great	work	
regionally.	Why	not	involve	them	in	that	
conversation?	As	it	is,	the	centers	are	trying	
really	hard	to	do	regional	work	-	if	you	can	
figure	out	how	to	get	through	all	the	
wickets.	It's	a	very	different	relationship	
right	now.	Fair?	
Gonzalez		 Absolutely.	
Terrier		 And	who	is	your	champion	at	headquarters?	
Gonzalez		 Nobody.	
Terrier		 So	the	Chief	Technology	Officer	can	be	the	
champion	at	headquarters	for	these	
initiatives	for	technology	both	ways?	
Gonzalez		 Now	you	know.	
Terrier		 Yeah	[laughter]	
Heracleous		 Thank	you,	Douglas.	We	very	much	
appreciate	your	time	and	your	insights.		
	
	
	
	
In	his	ground	breaking	book	on	the	history	and	
philosophy	of	science,	The	Structure	of	Scientific	
Revolutions7,	Thomas	Kuhn	outlined	the	tortuous	and	
lengthy	process	by	which	established	paradigms,	that	
guide	normal	science,	can	shift	towards	new	models.	
He	argued	that	when	particular	anomalies	are	regularly	
identified	in	scientific	findings,	scientists	initially	try	to	
fit	these	anomalies	into	the	prevailing	shared	wisdom,	
or	try	to	extend	the	boundaries	or	the	paradigm	itself	
to	accommodate	them.	Paradigms	get	severely	
challenged	and	superseded	only	when	there	is	
significant	accumulation	of	evidence	to	the	contrary,	
evidence	that	better	fits	a	new	paradigm;	a	paradigm	
that	can	provide	solutions	to	pressing	problems,	
together	with	the	necessary	new	infrastructure	of	
adherents,	funding,	and	belief	systems.		
	
NASA	is	in	the	midst	of	paradigm	change.	The	
traditional	model	of	large-scale	systems	engineering	
imported	from	the	military,	together	with	the	belief	
system	of	internal	self-sufficiency,	based	on	hands-on	
Forthcoming	in	Space	Policy,	2017,	https://www.journals.elsevier.com/space-policy/	
	
	 	 11	
experience,	and	research	and	testing	conducted	by	
exceptional	people,8	has	been	under	pressure	by	a	
number	of	external	developments.	These	include	the	
growth	of	commercial	space	accomplishing	things	
never	done	before	such	as	developing	re-usable	
rockets,	continuing	budget	and	political	pressure,	and	
robust	competition	from	non-US	space	organizations9.		
	
The	new	model	of	commercial	space	however	has	not	
subsumed	or	replaced	the	traditional	model,	one	of	the	
outcomes	Kuhn’s	theory	predicts	given	the	assumption	
of	incommensurability	of	the	two	paradigms.	Rather,	
NASA	has	been	interacting	with	commercial	space	in	
the	context	of	public-private	partnerships,	bringing	in	
the	wisdom	of	the	crowds	through	open	innovation	
projects,10	and	engaging	in	other	initiatives	inspired	by	
the	private	sector	such	as	organization	change.		
	
Terrier’s	interview	provides	deep	insights	into	the	
strategic,	leadership,	organizational	and	political	
dimensions	of	JSC	(and	NASA’s)	traditional	paradigm,	
that	both	challenge	as	well	as	facilitate	its	organization	
change	journey	towards	agility.	He	also	outlines	how	
change	and	a	new	model	are	being	introduced	
gradually	and	in	a	non-threatening	way,	through	
collaboration	with	the	private	sector	on	initiatives	such	
the	Commercial	Crew	program	taking	crew	up	to	the	
International	Space	Station;	gradually	providing	proof	
of	concept	for	a	new	paradigm.	Beginning	from	
projects	associated	with	Low	Earth	Orbit,	rather	than	
challenging	the	deep	space	projects	such	as	the	Mars	
program,	these	initiatives	slowly	win	converts,	and	new	
beliefs	and	operating	models	gradually	spread	through	
the	agency.	As	Terrier	notes,	a	big	bang	approach	to	
organization	change	would	produce	significant	
resistance	and	disrupt	current	programs.	Hence	the	
incremental	model	of	change	that	introduces	a	
gradually	expanding	new	paradigm	that	interacts	with	
the	traditional	paradigm.	Terrier’s	insights	indicate	that	
the	journey	to	agility	does	not	simply	depend	on	the	
implementation	of	a	plan	or	on	a	leader	proclaiming	
the	goal.	Rather	it	is	a	complex,	multi-dimensional,	
socio-technical	challenge	that	takes	time	and	
commitment	to	accomplish,	particularly	for	an	
organization	with	a	long	history	of	ground	breaking	
accomplishments	using	its	particular,	traditional	modus	
operandi.			
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